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Abstract
Recently some authors have proposed to introduce a system of individual  unemployment savings accounts
as an al temative to t radit ional  public  unemployment insurance.  In this  paper we invest igate the feasibi l i ty
of  individual  accounts  as  a  possible al temative route to address  the equity-efficiency  trade-off  of  public
benefit  systems and increase labor force part icipation in Europe.  Under a system of individual accounts,
workers save a share of their wage in special accounts to draw  unemployment  compensat ion from these
accounts when  they are laid off. Individual accounts reduce  the adverse  incentives of traditional
unemployment insurance because individuals  intemalize the costs  of  unemployment .  The system might
have negative consequences for labor market dynamics  and restructuring,  as i t  may  harm the ‘ irr igation
function’ of unemployment benefits for the economy,  when  workers would be to willing to accept
ineffrcient  jobs, just to save on withdrawals from their accounts. Another adverse  effect of individual
accounts  is  that  i t  may  introduce dual  labor markets  and decrease solidarity between workers with a high
and a low unemployment risk. We conclude that, despite the disadvantages, the idea of individual
accounts deserves  ser ious at tent ion as  this  form of  inst i tut ional  innovat ion addresses  the key problem of
contemporary benefit  sys tems in  many  Europ
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1. Introduction
Okun’s well-known argument about the trade-off between equity and efficiency stresses  the
adverse  economie  effects of benefit systems. According to this argument (unemployment)
benefït expenditures are thrown in a leaky bucket because the welfare loss of those who  pay the
premiums is larger than the welfare gain of those who  benefit  from unemployment insurance or
welfare benefíts. Means tested benefïts have created unemployment traps for many unemployed
workers in Europe, as net gains from taking up employment are marginal or even negative.
Adverse labor supply effects, a high leve1 of long-term unemployment and labor market
sclerosis are also part of this welfare loss and these are prominent features of most European
labor markets.  In addition to this most policy makers fee1 the need to increase labor force
participation to guarantee the future sustainability of the govemment budget, given the
projected higher share of elderly in the population.
In an attempt  to reverse  the negative economie  impact of existing unemployment benefít
systems and increase labor force participation, most European govemments have put forward
reform proposals. In most commies  attempts to change the benetït leve1 and duration,
entitlement conditions, job search and acceptance conditions or other institutional
characteristics of social benefit  schemes  have met with rising popular and politica1 discontent.
Except  for The Netherlands and Great Britain progress has been very  slow  (Smith (1999)).
In this paper we investigate individual savings accounts  as a possible altemative route to
address  Okun’s trade-off (Okun  (1975)) and increase labor force participation in Europe. We
address  both theoretical implications and the practica1 feasibility of individual accounts,  given
the current structure  of public unemployment benetït schemes  in Europe.
The idea to replace or supplement public unemployment insurance schemes  with individual
unemployment accounts  recently received considerable  attention in the intemational literamre
(Orszag and Snower (1997a,  1997b) and Feldstein and Altman (1998)). In some countries, for
example Singapore, individual accounts  are already used to fínance  unemployment benefïts and
the Dutch govemment has advocated  the idea in moderate terms’ (Tweede Kamer (1996-1997),
see also Van der Ploeg (1996) and Van Wijnbergen (1996) for supportive views of the idea).
Under individual savings accounts,  sometimes popularly referred to as ‘backpacks’, workers
accumulate  capita1 from compulsory contributions paid from their wages. Unemployment
benefits are paid to individual workers from these accounts  and if a positive balance remains
when  the worker retires, it may be added to the individual’s old age pension. An element of risk
solidarity based on public insurance wil1 remain, as a negative balance wil1 be forgiven when
the worker retires (or possibly prior to retirement as a specifïc  policy measure to promote  labor
force participation).
An important advantage of this reform strategy for unemployment benetït systems is that
existing institutional characteristics of unemployment insurance schemes,  notably the benetït
leve1 and duration, can remain unchanged. On other hand we wil1 see that Okun’s trade-off
remains and that individual accounts,  while signifïcantly improving labor market incentives,
reduce  risk-solidarity among workers. However  this does not automatically imply that workers
with a high unemployment probability wil1 be worse off or in other words, that those who  need
l unemployment benetïts most would be hurt most severely by the introduction of individual
’ The Social  and Economie  Council, a tripartite advisory  council of the Dutch govemment, however  rejected the
idea based on arguments discussed  in this paper (SER (1997),  p.  269-270).
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accounts. As the benefït leve1 and duration do not need to change, changes in the income
distribution, in terms of lifetime income, wil1 depend  on the exact structure  of the new benefït
system, how  to deal with negative account balances and what exactly wil1 be the impact of
improved labor market incentives. Still, the reduction in risk-solidarity is an important aspect,
given the prominente  of equity and solidarity in the social choice íùnction of European
societies.
Furthermore the idea of individual accounts fits  in very  wel1 with some important socio-
economie  trends in Europe, such as the increasing demand  for individual options and
responsibilities, as wel1 as individualization, i.e. the strive for economie  independente.
We discuss the theoretical pros and cons that have been raised in the literature. To this we add a
discussion of the effect of individual accounts on labor market dynamics.  We focus on the
question to what extent individual accounts contribute  to the process  of structural adjustment
from unproductive to productive  jobs that is part of job creation and destruction cycles.  In this
respect it is important to realize that unemployment has an important economie  íünction.
Unemployment, up to a certain level, is unavoidable because of labor market frictions,  and it is
a necessary precondition for the labor market to iûnction well.
In addition we discuss a number of practica1 issues that need to be addressed when  considering
individual unemployment accounts as an altemative to the public unemployment benefit
systems present in Europe. Such issues are the way to maintain risk solidarity, ways to calculate
the workers’ mandatory contributions, implementation issues, and consequences for the income
distribution, among others. We also present a simple framework to assess whether individual
accounts are a realistic and favorable option for institutional reform of public unemployment
insurance schemes2. Three considerations are centra1 in any assessment of benefit  system
reform proposals namely, i) the nature  of the program (i.e. universal versus targeted coverage),
ii) a liberal or a tight ‘gatekeeper’ tünction,  and iii) incentives for reintegration (passive versus
active).
In the next section  we discuss the main characteristics and merits  of individual accounts as
presented in the intemational literature. In section  three we contribute  to this literature by
analyzing individual accounts form the point of view of the flow approach to the labor market
to address  dynamic  labor market issues. We also analyze a number of practica1 issues that are
likely to arise when  implementing individual accounts in the existing institutional framework,
and we discuss some feasible modifications to the basic  model presented in Section  2. We use
our assessment framework to analyze whether integrating individual accounts in the
unemployment benefit  systems common in Europe would be benefícial in terms of efficiency
and labor market participation. A discussion of the most prominent pros and cons concludes
this article.
*  Our approach to social insurance focuses  on monetary incentives. Unemployed benefit  recipients respond
- signifïcantly to changes in benefit  level,  punitive sanctions or other monetary incentives (see for example Van den
Berg (1990) and Van der Klaauw (2000)). We assume that job search intensity and job acceptance decisions of
unemployed workers are dominated by rational, fïnancial  considerations. From sociological and psychological
literature it is wel1  know however  that other motives are also relevant for labor market decisions, such as social status
and self esteem  derived from  forma1 employment (Clark and Oswald (1994)).
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2. Unemployment benefits through individual accounts
Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Omzag and Snower (1997a,  1997b) have explored some
theoretical and empirical characteristics of different types of individual accounts. We discuss
the implications of the idea based on the bare  bones  model of Feldstein and Altman. It is
assumed that guidelines for withdrawing money from the accounts, such as the benefit  leve1 and
duration are set by the govemment, as wel1 as the fixed mandatory contributions to the
individual accounts. In fact,  it is assumed that a particular unemployment insurance system is
transformed into a system of individual accounts without any change in entitlement rules,
benefit  level, duration and other institutional characteristics. Many variations are conceivable,
but throughout this paper we wil1 use the Feldstein-Altman model outlined in Table 1 as our
frame of reference3.
The most significant advantage of this way to finance  unemployment benefits is that it
generates better incentives for workers to prevent unemployment and to strive for rapid outflow
from unemployment than traditional public unemployment insurance schemes.  Under
individual accounts risk solidarity cannot and wil1 not be eliminated completely, as we wil1 see.
The static  calculations of the impact of individual accounts for the United States indicate that
with a high saving base more than 5 percent of the workers has a negative account balance
when  they retire, and almost 7 percent has a negative account balance at some moment during
their career  (Feldstein and Altman (1998)). A quarter of these workers stil1 have a positive
account balance when  they withdraw from  the labor market, die or retire. One out  of every  four
unemployment spells ends  with a negative account balance for the worker involved. Eighty
percent of these workers have a negative account balance at the end of their career.  Feldstein
and Altman estimate that individual accounts wil1 improve incentives for half of the number of
weeks that unemployment benefits are paid and for half of the number of unemployment spells.
In countries such as Australia, Chile and Singapore, pensions are fïnanced  by means of
individual accounts. In other countries there is a public debate whether the existing public
social security systems with defined benefïts  should be replaced by individual accounts with
defined contributions (see Orszag et al. (1999)). This issue was one of the major controversies
in the 2000 presidential election race in the United States. In Singapore individual accounts are
used to finance benefits for different contingenties  (Ministry of Economie Affairs (2000) and
Connolly and Munro (1999)). There is one compulsory, individual savings account for workers,
the Centra1 Provident Fund. Employers and employees each contribute  20 percent, depending
on minimum and maximum contributions. Workers use their account to pay unemployment
benefits, disability pensions, retirement-pensions and costs  for health care. Within certain
limits, workers can withdraw positive balances when  they reach  the age of 55. At retirement
age al1 positive balances can be added to the retirement pension scheme.  After the introduction
of the system in 1955, rules  for withdrawal have been relaxed. Workers are allowed to invest
positive balances in private housing property, government bonds  or stocks. Parents are also
permitted to fmance  loans for their children’s education from their account. Depending on the
rate  of return and individual choices that people make, the account balance can be higher or
lower than the sum of the contributions.
.
3  Some of the variations one could think of are allowing employees to make additional contributions to their
individual account, and introducing additional individual accounts for risks  related to disability, health and retirement
and investment in human  capital.  Several options on how  to deal with negative balances are conceivable, an issue we
wil1  return to later. Most of these idea are discussed  briefly in Orszag and Snower (1997b).
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Table 1 - Characteristics of individual accounts
Contributions and withdrawals
- Every  worker contributes  a percentage of the gross wage (4 % in Feldstein and Altman’s
calculations) to a personal savings account. The saving base is equal to the current wage on
which unemployment insurance premiums are based.
- Contributions are mandatory until a certain amount of capita1 has been accumulated. When
this threshold leve1 of capita1 has been accumulated, contributions may be terminated.
- Unemployment benefits are paid from an individual savings account according to certain
withdrawal rules  set by the govemment.
- Positive balances are added to the worker’s pension rights when the worker reaches
retirement age or are bequested if the worker dies before he or she reaches retirement age.
Coverage
- Benefït duration and leve1 are identical to current unemployment insurance schemes.
- When the account balance is inadequate to pay unemployment benefïts, the government
pays the benefíts and debits  the workers account by the same amount.
Debit and credit balances
- The account balances can be invested into stocks and bonds  according to the same rules
that apply to investments for second  pillar pensions*.
- When they start their contributions, workers have to choose a conservative  investment
strategy  (low risk, low return on investment) or an offensive investment strategy (high risk,
high return on investment), and they are not entitled to change this strategy.
- Positive account balances generate  an interest rate  corresponding to the chosen  strategy.
- The government, charging the same interest rate, covers negative balances, which are
forgiven when  the worker retires or dies.
Fiscal matters
- Contributions and capita1 accumulations in the individual’s savings account are tax-fiee.
- Payments drawn from the account when the worker becomes unemployed, retires or dies
are taxed according to current tax laws.
l
Feldstein and Altman  indicate  that it is natura1 for the govemment to implement strict  rules  for investing in
unemployment savings accounts because the govemment eventually will have to finance negative account balances.
Because the govemment in this way bears part of the unemployment risk, workers wil1  make a different trade-off
between risk and return on investment than they would have done otherwise.
Incentives, unemployment and labor force participation
The primary differente  between individual accounts and collective unemployment insurance is
that individual accounts in a sense contribute  to a better functioning of the labor market.
Advocates  claim that individual accounts contribute  to lower unemployment rates,  more labor
supply and higher labor force participation. Public unemployment insurance schemes  influence
the individual’s labor supply decision because these schemes  change the relative prices  of
- leisure and hours worked. On the one hand the value of employment increases because the
worker becomes entitled to unemployment benefïts,  which has a positive impact on labor force
participation. On the other hand, workers have to contribute  part of their wages to public
unemployment insurance funds by paying premiums and hence they do not gain the full
revenues  from their labor. Workers wil1 supply less hours of work if the substitution effect
4
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dominates the income  effect. In that case unemployment insurance schemes are not neutral with
respect to the individual labor supply and labor force participation decision and these schemes
generate negative extemal effects. Under individual accounts workers wil1 make a more neutral
decision when  allocating time over work and leisure because relative prices  are less distorted,
as workers pay for their own unemployment benefits (Feldstein and Altman (1998)). This wil1
induce  more hours worked, higher labor force participation and wil1 therefore raise production4.
Employees who  have a positive balance and expect to maintain one have an incentive to avoid
unemployment or limit the duration of unemployment as much  as possible. Contrary, workers
who  have a persistent negative balance or who  expect to have a negative balance at the time of
retirement don’t have this incentive. For these workers incentives are not better under a system
of unemployment accounts than under a system of public unemployment insurance. If
unemployment accounts are indeed to lower unemployment, taxes and premiums wil1 be lower
and this wil1 improve the work incentives for unemployed workers. Because their net payment
increases their job-search effort wil1 be higher and they wil1 be more likely to accept a job
offe?.
Collective unemployment insurance schemes raise the sensitivity of the unemployment rate  to
extemal economie  shocks. According to Feldstein and Altman (1998) this contributes  to the
fact that contemporary unemployment schemes financed by premiums generate inefficiently
high levels of short-texm  unemployment. Firms lay workers off when  (expected) protïts  are
disappointing and (re)-hire workers when business picks  up again. In most European countries
this mechanism of hiring-and-firing is limited by labor market regulation, but even than
collective unemployment insurance schemes can contribute  to seasonal unemployment and
other forms of short-term unemployment (see for example for The Netherlands a study by
Alessie et al. (1999)). Under a system of individual accounts this mechanism  is limited because
workers take into account the costs  of short spells of unemployment.
Using a forma1 equilibrium model with overlapping generations, Orszag and Snower (1997b)
show that not only the equilibrium unemployment rate  is lower under a system of individual
accounts, but also the impact of the benefit leve1 on equilibrium unemployment is less. In other
words: given equilibrium unemployment, a system of individual accounts allows for a higher
benefit  leve1 than an unemployment insurance scheme. This would imply that countries that
prefer relatively high replacement rates,  such as Belgium, France,  Germany, Sweden and The
Netherlands, could limit the related negative labor supply effects through the introduction of
individual unemployment accounts.
If individual accounts are indeed to lower equilibrium unemployment the total contributions to
the individual accounts wil1 be lower than the average  unemployment insurance premiums paid
under a public unemployment insurance scheme. This wil1 lower labor costs  and induce  a rise
in net wages, depending on the relative bargaining power of employers and unions.  A smaller
wedge (i.e. the differente  between the wage bil1 and net wages) wil1 raise both labor supply and
demand  and hence the leve1 of employment wil1 be higher.
4 In an insider-outsider model, where  productivity is endogenously determined, individual accounts wil1  generate
. higher productivity (Orszag  and Snower (1997b)).  As the worker contributes  part of his wage to a savings account
that is his own he wil1  take into account the costs  of unemployment and hence increase his work effort to reduce  the
probability that he wil1 be laid-off.
’ Orszag et al. (1999) draw  attention to the costs  of administrating individual unemployment accounts. High costs
could lower the value of the accounts, which could diminish the positive effects on incentives.
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Risk, solidarity and incomes
The trade-off between equity and efficiency is at the center of the public debate about benefit
systems (Okun  (1975)). Solidarity implies that good and bad risks are pooled, implying that
workers with a high and a low lay-off probability pay the same unemployment insurance
premium. The trade-off with efficiency arises because workers can shift part of the
unemployment risk to the aggregate leve1 and have less incentives to control  the costs of
unemployment insurance. In fact they pass the costs of unemployment insurance to society. In
this sense mora1 hazard is an important source of inefficiency in benefit  systems.
Individual accounts deprive workers of the possibility to shift the unemployment risk to others.
This inevitably implies that the risk solidarity incorporated in collective unemployment
insurance schemes  wil1 be partly abandoned. Workers can use positive balances to supplement
their individual old age pension. Under a system of collective unemployment insurance these
means  favor the entire pool of insured workers through the payment of uniform insurance
premiums. In this way workers with a high unemployment risk receive a subsidy from workers
with a low unemployment risk. Risk solidarity remains insofar workers with negative individual
account balances can claim forgiveness of debts or if they are entitled to welfare benefits.  The
govemment wil1 support unemployed workers who  are without means  because they can no
longer fïnance  their unemployment benefit from their individual account. Workers are aware of
this however,  and hence the possibility to shit3 part the unemployment risk and associated costs
to society remains. Mora1 hazard does not disappear under a system of individual accounts.
Therefore it is necessary that the contributions to the accounts are mandatory and to make
withdrawals from the accounts conditional in order to assure that the individual accounts are
put to use in the appropriate way.
Individual accounts imply a shift of the equity-efficiency trade-off towards efficiency, but
equity, i.e. risk solidarity, does not vanish. It is important to note however,  that in the
continental European tradition many  observers wil1 find the reduction of risk solidarity a high
price  to pay for the efficiency gains. The fact that risk-solidarity has such substantial weight in
the social choice function of European societies, should be given proper consideration when
actually designing a proposal  to introduce some form of individual accounts.
We mentioned before that to some extent risk risk-solidarity has to be maintained when benefits
are provided through individual accounts. This can be done via ex ante redistribution where  the
government redistributes wealth between individual accounts of high and low income  workers
by taxing workers with substantial positive account balances and subsidizing workers with
smal1 or negative account balances. Another option is ex post redistribution by allowing
negative account balances (see Table 1). Workers facing a negative balance can borrow from
the state  against the market interest rate. Solidarity arises because negative balances are
forgiven at retirement age. A disadvantage is that some workers could face large negative
balances early in their career and could be locked into this situation for the rest of their working
life, thereby introducing a new type of unemployment trap. This wil1 limit the positive incentive
effects  of individual accounts. One way to meet this problem is to convert  the unemployment
benefit  into a welfare benefit from the moment on that the worker’s individual account is
exhausted. Because in genera1 the welfare benefit is lower than the unemployment insurance
benefit,  this wil1 limit the accumulation of negative balances. Negative balances can be
. precluded if welfare benefits are not debited from the individual’s account but instead are
funded from genera1 tax revenues. In this model an unemployed worker is entitled to public
welfare benefïts once his individual account is exhausted and there is no option to accumulate
negative account balances and continue to receive higher unemployment benefïts, as in the
Feldstein-Altman  proposal outlined before.
Individual accounts effect the income distribution in three ways: contributions, accumulated
wealth at the moment of retirement and the adjustment of the genera1 payroll tax rate6. For
workers who  have experienced no spells of unemployment during their career, the net present
value of their contributions and payout is zero; al1 contributions are accumulated and added to
their pension scheme.  These workers wil1 benefit  from the introduction of individual accounts
because the tax revenues  needed to support workers with high unemployment risks and hence
smal1 or negative account balances are less than the premiums paid for public unemployment
insurance. Workers with a negative balance at the end of their career wil1 grow worse because
the lower payroll tax rates  do not compensate  the contributions they have made to their
accounts. These are two extreme cases. In genera1 workers who  experience frequent and long
spells of unemployment wil1 contribute  more to their accounts during their career than workers
who  have a low unemployment risk. Feldstein and Altman show however  that the effects  would
be smal1 for most households in the United States’.
Summing up, based on theoretical and empirical considerations the advocates  of individual
accounts conclude that such an unemployment benefit system can lead to a lower
unemployment rate  and shorter average  unemployment duration, lower wage costs  and a higher
leve1 of employment and labor force participation than customary publicly financed benefit
schemes.  The gains are expected to outweigh the costs  of benefits needed to support
unemployed workers with smal1 or negative account balances. In addition, the cited authors
expect  higher returns to investments in human  capital, an issue we wil1 address  later. The price
paid is a reduction of risk solidarity.
3. Individual accounts versus traditional ptibic unemployment benefït
systems
In this section  we analyze in what format individual accounts could be part of institutional
reforms of conventional public benefït  systems. We have mentioned some options to limit the
loss of risk solidarity associated with individual accounts. In this section  we wil1 discuss  other
practica1 modifications and implementation issues that wil1 need to be addressed under a system
of individual unemployment accounts. In the following we wil1 evaluate individual accounts
using an assessment framework. We pay special attention to the reintegration function of the
unemployment benefit  system and the impact of individual accounts on labor market dynamics,
as this aspect has been ignored in the literature so far.
At present, most European countries have an unemployment benefit system that consists of a
temporary unemployment insurance benefit and, if necessary a subsequent welfare benefit.
Workers who  become unemployed are usually entitled to some form of unemployment
insurance. Often  this is a compulsory public insurance with benefit levels and duration based on
past contributions and employment record. Contributions are usually linked to wages and paid
by employers and employees. In most countries employers and employees are represented in
. 6 We do not take into account changes  in wages and prices  of other production factors.
’ Their calculations show that breadwinners at the lower end of the income distributions grow worse 95 dollars in
net present value, over a period of 25 years. Workers in the 10-20 percent range of the income distribution benefit  22
dollars and workers in the upper  end of the income distribution gain 468 dollars. These changes  in discounted
eamings are remarkably small.
bodies that administer unemployment insurance schemes, in some commies they are also
involved in supervision. When entitlement to unemployment insurance benefïts expires
unemployed workers become entitled to means-tested welfare benefïts. Usually welfare benefïts
are paid at the subsistence level, they are flat rate  and the benefít duration is unlimited. In most
countries there is a genera1 social assistance scheme, but Germany, France  and Spain have a
special means-tested unemployment assistance program’.
financed’.
Welfare benefits are mostly tax-
An assessment framework for benefit systems and reform
The aim of social benefit  schemes is to protect  people from the fínancial consequences of
unemployment, disability, retirement and other social risks. Additionally the benefit  system
aims to prevent these contingenties  and if possible to reintegrate workers in the labor market.
Proposals to reform the benefit  system should help to secure these two main goals”. Three
considerations are centra1 in the assessment of benefit system reform proposals such as
individual accounts:  coverage, entitlement rules  (the ‘gatekeeper’ function) and reintegration.
The fírst  consideration relates to the coverage and scope of a particular reform proposal. The
key question here is who  is entitled to the benefit.  In policy discussions this issue is often
addressed as a choice between universal and targeted polities.  The advantage of targeted
polities  is that they directly address  a particular social risk of a narrowly defïned  group, but a
disadvantage is that people, who  a priori do not belong to the target group, have an incentive to
adjust their behavior to fit the criteria of the target group. Other adverse  behavioral effects  of
targeted polities  are also common. The Eamed Income  Tax Credit is an example of a targeted
(tax) policy, aimed to increase labor supply of low-wage workers. The tax credit decreases as
the worker’s income  rises,  the so-called phase-out  range. The high implicit  marginal tax rate  in
the phase out  range of the tax credit induces  workers to invest  less in their human  capital.
Furthermore the relative prices  of labor are distorted. The scope of universal polities  is much
wider so more people are entitled to a particular benefït  and hence there are less incentives for
adverse  behavioral changes.  Universal polities  however  suffer from a large deadweight 10s~:
many  of those who  are entitled to the benefit or subsidy do not really need it. A good example
is a genera1 tax credit for workers aiming to increase labor supply and unemployment outflow”.
This measure does not cause labor market distortions, but given the govemment’s budget
constraint the leve1 of the tax credit has to be limited due to the wide scope of the measure, and
as a result the impact on labor supply and unemployment outflow wil1 be limited. A sensible
middle course with respect to the coverage and scope of benefit systems is to aim for measures
as generally as possible with the smallest deadweigtht 10s~.
Once the scope and corresponding entitlement criteria of a benefit  scheme have been
determined, it has to be considered how  to ver@ and enforce  these. Applications have to be
*  The differente  between the social assistance scheme for unemployed werkers  and for persons  without prior
employment usually  relates  to the type of means-testing,  which is typically  less tight for unemployment assistance
benefits.
9 There are some deviations from this general  description of unemployment protection in Europe, most notably
(Schmidt  and Reissert (1996)): i) In The Netherlands, Denmark  and Sweden the unemployment insurance fund is
supplemented form genera1 tax-revenues; ii) In the United Kingdom  the genera1 social-insurance  system receives  a
cross-subsidy from the unemployment insurance fund, and iii) In Denmark  and Sweden contributions to
. unemployment insurance are flat rate  although benetïts  are income-related.
” Obviously efficiency and feasibility should also be considered.
” This was the objective  of the general  tax credit for workers included in the Dutch tax reform package that wil1
become effective  in 2001.
evaluated and entitlement decisions have to be taken. This gatekeeper fùnction determines who
wil1 be granted a particular benefit  and what the benefit  leve1 and duration wil1 be. Strict
enforcement of the entitlement criteria implies that there is a limited probability that persons
who  are not entitled to the provision stil1 are awarded one. This can be considered an error of
the tïrst  kind (Hazeu (1980)). On the other hand, strict  enforcement of entitlement criteria
increases the probability of an error of the second kind, namely persons  who  do not qualify
although they are fully entitled12. When entitlement polities  are generous the reverse  wil1
happen and the costs  wil1 rise because a significant number of persons  who  are not entitled wil1
in fact be granted a certain benefit.  Generally speaking, the gatekeeper fimction  is more
important and should be stricter  when the policy mix relies heavily on targeted polities  because
than persons  wil1 be more inclined to pretend that they meet the criteria when  in fact they do
not. To minimize the combination of errors of the first-  and second kind, the entitlement criteria
must be tested in such a way that the distinctive characteristics of the test are as substantial as
possible. One major problem however  is that usually those who  want to be awarded a certain
social provision are better informed about their actual characteristics than the gatekeepers.
Improving the distinctive characteristics implies that this information asymmetry must be
reduced, but this can be costly.
Designing the entitlement criteria and the scope and determining whether potential
beneficiaries  are in fact entitled to a benefit  or subsidy does not conclude the organization or
the reform of benefit  schemes.  It is important that beneflciaries  reintegrate in the regular labor
market as soon as possible and benefit programs for unemployed workers, as wel1 as disabled-
and ill workers, should contribute  to rapid reintegration. This is the third consideration in the
assessment of benefit  system reform proposals. There are many  ways in which active
involvement and comrnitment of unemployed workers to labor market reintegration can be
promoted. Additionally, supervision of the workers’ reintegration activities, including their job
search activities, wil1 be necessary. Outflow from  unemployment can be promoted through
proper incentives in the benefit  system and complementaryactive labor market polities.
Evaluating individual accounts
Taking into account these considerations we discuss  the labor market implications of
implementing individual accounts.  Starting from the characteristics mentioned in Table 1, a
variant of individual unemployment accounts  to replace the existing public unemployment
benefit  system could be as follows. Workers do no longer pay premiums for collective
unemployment insurance, but instead mandatory contribute  a percentage of their taxable
income  to their individually owned unemployment accounts.  When laid off a worker receives
an unemployment benefit paid form his individual account. Unemployed workers who  accept a
job, are committed to supplement their account balance up to the minimum leve1 required. How
long it wil1 take to replenish the individual account obviously depends on the duration of the
unemployment spell. When the worker reaches retirement age, positive balances may be
transferred to the worker’s private pension scheme.
The characteristics of existing unemployment insurance do not change: benefit  leve1 and
duration, eligibility rules,  job search requirements and job acceptance criteria remain the same
under individual accounts.  The saving base for the worker’s individual account contributions is
identical to the current taxable income  for unemployment insurance premiums. The employer’s
. contribution to unemployment insurance premiums wil1 be abolished. Gross wages can be
” The concepts  of errors  of the first  and second kind originate from statistical theory. This theory also indicates
that attempts to reduce  errors  of the fïrst  kind automatically imply a rise in errors  of the second kind.
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raised correspondingly to keep net wages and the employer’s wage bil1 unchanged. In this
scenario the unemployment and social assistance schemes,  remain unchanged. Hence individual
accounts are to change the funding of benefïts currently paid by the public unemployment
insurance scheme.
Workers make mandatory contributions to their individual account. This commitment  expires if
enough means  have been accurnulated to fïnance the unemployment benefits to which the
worker is entitled. This implies that the minimum account balance wil1 be different depending
on the benefit  leve1 and the maximum benefit duration in a particular country. Belgian workers,
who  are entitled to quite high unemployment benefits and unlimited benefit  duration, wil1 face
higher minimum account balances that their Italian colleagues who  are entitled to a maximum
of 6 months of relatively low unemployment benefits. In some countries, such as France, The
Netherlands and Germany, the maximum benefit duration depends on the individual’s
employment record and hence the worker’s minimum account balance should rise during his
career.  For workers with smal1 unemployment probabilities these rules  might be too rigid. It is
worth considering a smaller income  and employment record related component to determine a
worker’s minimum account balance, and to make it partly dependent on past withdrawals. If we
assume there is a positive relation between a worker’s unemployment record and his current
unemployment risk, this would imply that workers with high unemployment probabilities face
higher mandatory minimum account balances.
Even if we adopt this variant it is conceivable that some workers cannot finance  the
unemployment benefit  they are entitled to from their individual account. One possible solution
is for the government to grant them a loan to pay their bene&,  as proposed by Feldstein and
Altman (1998). There are several options for repayment. The simplest form is for the worker to
start repaying the loan from  the moment he has found employment or shortly after. Only after
the loan has been repaid the worker can start accumulating funds in his individual account
again. Risk solidarity can be maintained in this scheme by transferring funds from workers with
positive account balances that exceed the minimum applicable to them, to workers with
negative balances’3.
Although under individual accounts public unemployment insurance does no longer exist,
contributions wil1 need to be mandatory, as mentioned before. If there would be no mandatory
contributions and the govemment would assume workers to make suffïcient  vohmtary
contributions to their unemployment accounts, problems would arise if workers are laid off and
it turns  out  that they are not able to fmance  their unemployment benefïts. Because the
government would in some way support these workers, most likely by granting them welfare
benefïts, some workers have an incentive not to make suffïcient  contribution to their accounts.
This would make the system of individual accounts unsustainable.
Several modifications are conceivable for the system of individual accounts outlined above.
One option is partial implementation. In countries where  employers pay part (Germany,
Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark,  Spain)  or al1 (Italy) of the unemployment insurance
premiums the employers’ contributions to unemployment insurance could be (partly)
l3  We assume here that the current  rules  for unemployment insurance benefits apply. However,  if we relax this
constraint, more options become available to prevent werkers  from accumulating large  negative balances. One option
- is to convert  the wage related unemployment benefit  into a subsistence leve1 benefit  at the moment the account
balance of the worker involved tums negative. In this case negative balances wil1  accumulate  slower. Negative
balances can  be precluded when  at the moment the account balance tums negative, the unemployment benefit  is
converted into a tax fimded  public welfare benetït.  Ceteris paribus  this would imply higher average  tax rates  and
lower mandatory contributions.
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maintained. Workers contribute less to their individual account and they withdraw less when
they receive unemployment benefits as part of the benefits would be fimded  from
unemployment insurance funds, which are funded from employers’ contributions, similar to the
present situation under public unemployment insurance. In countries where  the govemment
covers most of the costs, for example Sweden, a similar partial introduction could be obtained
by combining the introduction of individual accounts with lower government contributions to
the collective unemployment funds and lower income taxes.
Van der Ploeg (1996) suggests maintaining public unemployment insurance and supplementing
it with benefïts  from individual accounts. In this way he intends to uphold risk solidarity
between workers with a high and a low lay-off probability. Note however  that if the
contributions to the individual accounts are mandatory and if necessary wil1 be used to fïnance
supplements to regular unemployment benetïts,  this stil1 implies a reduction of the risk
solidarity. If contributions are voluntary, then there is no improvement of the incentive
structure  to increase unemployment outflow. As a transition scheme  though, a strong argument
can be made in favor of partial or supplementary forms of individual accounts, as the reduction
of risk solidarity that is inevitably linked to a full scale  switch form public unemployment
insurance to individual accounts, seems hardly attainable given politica1 preferences in Europe.
If we evaluate the idea of individual accounts using the assessment framework introduced
before, a few aspects  are noteworthy. Individual accounts can be interpreted as a form of
universal polities  because the system does not discriminate between certain groups of workers.
A system of individual accounts induces  little adverse  behavioral changes  and hence limits the
mora1 hazard problem. As mentioned before, an important disadvantage is the decrease in risk
solidarity, as workers with a high unemployment probability wil1 have to contribute more to
their accounts than workers with a low unemployment probability. The impact of the shift from
equity to efficiency depends on the scope of the individual account scheme and on how  much
redistribution the govemment wil1 impose between individnal accounts of low-risk workers and
high-risk workers. Although individual accounts can be considered a universal instead of a
targeted policy, the system does not have the inefficiency disadvantages that characterize many
other universal social polities  because the nature  of the scheme induces  workers to intemalize
the costs of unemployment. The worker’s behavior is directed  in a way that is socially optimal,
so the deadweight loss is limited.
Under individual accounts the gatekeeper fimction  remains important because the state  wil1
guarantee a subsistence income for workers who  have negative balances and because negative
balances are forgiven at retirement age. It seems reasonable to expect  however  that the positive
incentives for workers generated by the system wil1 diminish the importante  of the gatekeeper
function.  For example workers are more likely to accept jobs that they would have rejected as
being ‘unsuitable employment’ under a public unemployment insurance system. To put it
differently, there is little reason for the potential beneficiary to exploit the information
asymmetry with respect to the gatekeeper, so the distinctive characteristics can be substantial at
little tost.
Individual accounts are expected to have the strongest impact on the reintegration objective of
the benefit  system because improving outflow from unemployment is a major objective of the
scheme. Apart from the positive impact on unemployment outflow generated by better
. incentives, individual accounts can contribute to reintegration through active  labor market
polities.  Under the present public unemployment insurance system it is mainly the
govemment’s budget that benefits from rapid unemployment outflow. The govemment has an
inventive to initiate active  labor market polities  such as training programs, wage subsidies and
1 1
training jobs. These programs are quite costly and their impact is sometimes disputable (see
Van der Klaauw (2000)). Under individual accounts workers pay their own unemployment
benefits, so they have an incentive to invest  in activities that raise their unemployment outflow
probability. Both Orszag and Snower (1997b) and Feldstein and Altman (1998) propose  that
workers should be allowed to use their individual unemployment accounts to invest  in
vocational training, forma1 courses or job search counseling. Wage subsidies can also be
employed to overcome  the gap between the legal minimum wage and the worker’s productivity.
In a sense, unemployment benefits are used to promote  outflow from  unemployment.
It is also conceivable that employed workers are allowed to use their individual accounts to
invest in their human  capita1 to improve their employability and reduce  their unemployment
probability. Under a system of individual accounts workers have an even greater incentive to
maintain and increase their skills, keep up with new (technological) developments and make
sure that they are able to apply their knowledge flexibly. Workers, who  foresee that their
current job might become unproductive in the future, can use their account balances to invest  in
their human  capita1 to prepare for a job or career shift.  For workers who  are laid off or become
disabled, the possibility to use their individual accounts for human  capita1 investments, can
make them decide not to withdraw benetïts  from their accounts so they can invest  more in
activities that facilitate their return to the labor market. People who  have been outside the labor
force for a long period of time, possibly because they had to take care of young children, could
use their individual accounts for similar purposes.
In section  2 we explained why individual accounts are likely to induce  lower average  tax- and
premium (contribution) levels. However,  to determine the effect of individual accounts on labor
supply decisions we need to take marginal tax rates into account. Low-skilled workers with a
high lay-off probability, mostly employed in shrinking industries, face a high risk of long
unemployment spells. These workers wil1 have a high implicit marginal tax rate  once their
individual accounts are exhausted. They could even become subject to a poverty or
unemployment trap because additional income  from working more hours or taking up
employment wil1 be needed to balance or supplement their individual accounts. These workers
won? be able to supplement their retirement pensions from their account balances, at least not
in the short  run. This could prevent them from accepting a job offer or from working more
hours and make them decide  to be satisfïed  with the minimum state  pension they wil1 be
entitled to after  retirement. The risk that workers with negative or marginal individual account
balances wil1 come to face an unemployment or poverty trap is more likely to arise for older
workers. On the other side  there are high skilled privileged workers in expanding industries
with low unemployment probabilities. Implicit marginal tax rates wil1 decrease for these
workers and this wil1 give them an incentive, if allowed, for additional contributions to their
individual accounts to obtain higher retirement pensions. This mechanism  could lead to a new
type of labor market segregation. Once again this stresses  the argument to preserve some form
of risk solidarity and to enforce  redistribution between individual accounts.
Obviously the institutional setting of the benefit system wil1 change dramatically if the current
system of public unemployment insurance would be replaced by or supplemented with
individual accounts. If the system is fully fimded  banks, pension funds and possibly insurance
companies  are likely to administer the unemployment accounts, as they possess the appropriate
infrastructure  and knowledge. Under a full-scale implementation the public unemployment
. insurance funds would become superfluous.
In principle the institutions that administer the current unemployment insurance benefït  scheme
could continue to exist because the benefit rules  and, which is important, the gatekeeper
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function remain. The administrative bodies could be downsized, with correspondingly lower
costs,  if the positive effects  of individual accounts indeed generate lower unemployment.
Benefit  systems also effect the relation between unions,  employers’ organizations and the
government.  In corporatist commies such as Germany, as wel1 as for example France  and
Spain,  unions and employers’ organizations play an important role in the administration of
public unemployment insurance schemes. Apart from the issue whether unions would agree
with a system of individual accounts, such a benefit  system could reduce  their influence and
power. In The Netherlands part of unions’  and employer organizations’ influence arises from
their involvement in the design and implementation of active labor market polities.  These
polities  are partly fïnanced  from  unemployment insurance premiums, so under a system of
individual accounts they wil1 have to be funded from altemative sources. Workers would
probably want more influence on the way public reintegration means  are used. It is also
conceivable that these means  are transfexred  to the individual accounts to give workers
individual control  over means  to fund active labor market programs when  they are unemployed.
On the  ether hand, unions could gain influence, as collective labor agreements are likely to
become more important. The benefit  system can be integrated into existing fringe benefïts  for
workers if employers contribute  to the individual accounts. This would become part of
employer-union (wage) negotiations, and hence the scope of union influence becomes wider14.
We mentioned in the introduction that individual accounts fit in very  wel1 with socio-economie
trends in Europe, such as (economie)  individualization, and the demand  for more individual
options and responsibilities. Individualization has increased the demand  for individual options
in many  areas,  including social protection. These trends are also observable in collective labor
agreements (CLA’s).  More and more unions  and employers opt for so called ‘menu CLA’s’,
which provide workers with options regarding hours worked, annual leave, training and,
notably, pension rights. Finally, we note that to the extent that the substantial rise in welfare in
the past decades has reduced werkers’  risk-aversion, individual accounts provide a possible
way to accommodate  to this situation. The nature  of individual accounts comes close to these
social-economie  trends, and hence can be expected to appeal to a substantial part of the
working population.
Labor marketjlows  and individual accounts
An important aim of benefit  systems is to protect  workers from social risks. However
unemployment benefits also serve an important macro-economie efficiency goal, sometimes
labeled the ‘irrigation function’  (Korpi (1985),  see also Den Butter and Koek (1998)). In this
view there is a positive relation between unemployment benefit  schemes and economie
efficiency because a lack of unemployment protection could hamper  a dynamic  economie
development. Increased intemational competition, stronger product market dynamics  and
fundamental technological change are expected to raise job insecurity, job-to-job changes  and
labor market dynamics,  stressing the relevante  of the irrigation fimction.  Partly due to
unemployment bene&,  workers are not forced  to accept or hold on to inefficient jobs and slow
down the process  of job creation and job destruction. Temporary unemployment might be
unavoidable in this process  of job moving and structural change.
.
l4 In this respect it is important that the individual accounts to be strictly personal en not to be linked to a
particular employer because this could hamper  labor market mobility. In the past similar problems occurred when
workers suffered reductions in their pension claims due to frequent job movements during their career.
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Introducing individual accounts wil1 have consequences for labor market flows and hence labor
market dynamics and it is therefore interesting to evaluate what impact such a benefit  system is
likely to have on the irrigation function of unemployment benefits.  This can be seen as
supplementary to the framework discussed  before. By analyzing the various labor market
transitions we can get a picture of the labor market dynamics.
Workers who  have been laid off wil1 be more willing to accept a job because they bear the full
costs of their unemployment benefïts. Workers who  foresee their lay-off wil1 have a stronger
incentive than under a system of public unemployment insurance to start searching for a job
while stil1 employed. Individual accounts are therefore likely to decrease the inflow into
unemployment and increase the outflow from unemployment. This can be regarded benefïcial,
provided that there are no negative consequences for the quality of the job-worker match.
Increased outflow from  unemployment can take place at the expense of efficient labor
allocation if these workers, pushed by continued withdrawals from their individual accounts,
accept jobs with lower productivity than what they could have achieved had they continued
their job search.
The same applies if the worker who  wil1 be laid off accepts  a low productivity job to prevent
unemployment and withdrawals from  his individual account, while continued job search,
possibly while receiving unemployment benefïts, might have resulted in finding a job with a
higher productivity and wage. Through these mechanisms  and because workers might hold on
to unproductive jobs to prevent withdrawals from  their individual accounts, the irrigation
function might be hampered. This wil1 limit labor market dynamics and might hamper  the
process  of structural labor market adjustment.
As mentioned before, under a system of individual accounts workers who  are laid off wil1
search harder for a job and are more likely to accept a job offer because continued
unemployment reduces their individual account balances. However,  unemployed workers could
just as wel1 give up their entitlement to unemployment benefïts in order to save money fi-om
their accounts. Although these workers could stil1 be searching for jobs, they are not registered
as unemployed workers. Formally, they are outside the labor force and they can obtain their
means of living from relatives or other sources. There is no reason why this shift of labor
market flows should hamper  structnral adjustment at the labor market.
In addition to a lay-off, outflow from  employment can take place because workers voluntarily
quit their job. Usually these workers are not entitled to unemployment insurance benefïts.
Under a system of individual accounts it wil1 be even more unlikely that workers prefer
voluntary unemployment and claim unemployment benefïts to fínance job search. Whatever the
reason of unemployment, lay-off or quit,  non-employed workers are not able to make
contributions to their individual accounts, which wil1 raise the costs of non-employment. Under
a system of individual accounts on-the-job search is likely to be the most prominent source of
labor market dynamics, even more than under the present public benefit  system.
On the other hand, workers have stronger incentives to withdraw from  the labor market
temporarily to receive  education and training if they are allowed to fïnance  these activities from
their individual account. Workers could use their individual accounts to fïnance  training and
education to prepare for a career shift or a promotion. Another option is to integrate individual
. accounts with additional matemity leave or recent developments in labor relations and fringe
benefïts, such as sabbatical- and care leave.
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We can conclude that a system of individual accounts performs wel1 when  evaluated according
to the framework presented here, in particular when  it is to be introduced  partially and
gradually. The price paid is a loss of risk solidarity. This issue is of major importante  and
deserved special attention, given politica1 preferences and a tradition of risk sharing among
workers in Europe. Viewed from the perspective of the irrigation tünction of unemployment
bene&,  the pros slightly seem to outweigh the cons.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper adds  to the existing literature on individual accounts i) a discussion of the impact on
labor market dynamics  and ten ‘irrigation function’ of the benefit  system, and ii) a discussion of
issues that need to be addressed when individual accounts are to be implemented in public
benefit  systems like those currently present in Europe, such as risk solidarity, leve1 of
contributions, and institutional issues, among others.
The main economie  rationale to replace or supplement public unemployment insurance
schemes  with a system of individual accounts is based on Oknn’s  well-known argument about
the trade-off between equity and efficiency (Okun  (1975)). His argument is that transfer
payments for social benefits end up in a ‘leaky bucket’ because the welfare loss of those who
pay the social premiums is larger than the welfare gains of the benefit  recipients. The bucket’s
leak is due to the fact that premiums and taxes distort  incentives, causing macroeconomic
inefficiencies such as high and persistent unemployment rates,  a large share of long-tenn
unemployment and lower labor force participation. In this paper we analyzed individual
accounts from the perspective of employers, employees and labor market effïciency’5.
Through a number of mechanisms  individual accounts are expected to lower unemployment. A
system of individual accounts reduces the disincentives caused by collective unemployment
insurance as workers take into account the costs  of unemployment. Worker’s search effort and
job acceptance probability wil1 increase, which wil1 lower average  unemployment duration and
the unemployment rate. Although individual accounts are primarily aimed to increase
unemployment outflow, it can be expected that unemployment inflow wil1 also slow down. The
(shadow) price of unemployment and leisure wil1 rise as the revenues  from employment are
higher,  which wil1 cause labor force participation to rise, both in terms of hours worked and
persons.
On the other side  there is a risk that workers accept an inefficient job to prevent eating into
their capita1 although it rnight be better to continue searching for a more productive  job. For the
same reason they could hold on to an existing, less productive  job. This has an adverse  impact
on macroeconomic efficiency and hamper  the process  of structural adjustment. Individual
accounts however  enable workers to invest  in maintaining and expanding their human  capital.
This wil1 enhance their flexibility to adapt to changing labor market conditions and improve
their capacity to switch jobs or careers  if necessary. Under a system of individual accounts, the
irrigation fùnction  of unemployment benefïts  could be supplemented with active  labor market
polities.
In brief individual accounts are expected to improve incentives and hence increase ex ante
- utility. The reverse  is that a system of individual accounts could increase inequality among
” There are also macro-economie issues involved. See for a brief discussion of the impact on savings, economie
structure  and the govemment budget Koek  and Den Butter (2000).
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workers with a high and a low probability of (long-term) unemployment. A substantial part of
the risk solidarity incorporated in public benefit  schemes, vanishes. Risk solidarity involves the
danger of mora1 hazard and this can only be reduced by splitting up the uniform pool of insured
into smaller pools with different risk profiles and premiums. Experience rating is one way to do
so: premiums are being positively related to past claims. In the United States experience rating
is present in unemployment insurance, in most European countries it is not, although policy
proposals to introduce experience rating are common. Another way to reduce  mora1 hazard is to
grant insured persons  the option to leave the public insurance scheme and obtain private
insurance. ‘Opting out’  introduces  a form of competition in social insurance. Here the reverse  is
that the problem of adverse  selection arises. Insurers wil1 try to select clients with the lowest
probability that the contingency arises and in fact these clients are most likely to opt out  of the
public scheme. The trade-off between mora1 hazard and adverse  selection is at the core  of every
public benefit  system (Bovenberg (2000)). In a way, under individual accounts,  this trade-off is
evaded because there is no insurance mechanism  involved. Every  worker bears his own
unemployment risk by accumulating private savings to pay for personal unemployment
benefits.  Risks  cannot be shifted and mora1 hazard is limited because the worker must carry the
fïnancial consequences of such behavior, as unemployment benefits are withdrawn from his
personal account. Adverse selection is not an issue here because there is no risk pooling, as
under a system of public unemployment insurance. It is important to note that since there is no
insurance principle involved, the gains that risk adverse  individuals get from  insurance are also
partly lost.
Still, the trade-off between equity and efficiency is present also under a system of individual
accounts,  because negative balances wil1 be forgiven when a worker retires. Furthermore it
seems sensible to have some form of compensation for workers that come to face substantial
negative balances early in their career,  to prevent them from being locked-in in this situation.
Given the present structure  of benefit  systems in Europe it would seem convenient to grant
these workers tax fïnanced  unemployment or social assistance benefïts.  For these workers and
for workers who  expect  to have negative balances when they retire, mora1 hazard behavior
remains favorable. The issue of eligibility, the gatekeeper’s role, wil1 remain an important part
of benefit  policy, even under individual accounts.  As long as positive account balances at the
end of their career  seem realistic, workers wil1 however  reveal at least part of their hidden
personal characteristics, such as their job search intensity or employability, because the costs  of
unjustly claimed benefits are their own. The gatekeeper can use this information so it may be
expected that mora1 hazard can be contested more easily.
The idea of individual unemployment savings accounts  offers the possibility to lower
unemployment and raise labor force participation while maintaining present social rights.
Despite some important disadvantages, notably the reduction of risk solidarity (equity), the idea
offers an interesting option to limit the adverse  incentives of public unemployment insurance
schemes. For European countries, some of them struggling with benefit system reforms,
individual accounts  deserve  serious attention as this form of institutional innovation addresses
the key problem of their benefit systems: low outflow f?om unemployment and a high leve1 of
(hidden) inactivity. Individual accounts  could also make a contribution to accommodating the
social benefit system to the social-economie  trends of individualization, and the demand  for
more individual options and responsibilities. Finally, an advantage is that individual accounts
can be incorporated in the present benefit system in a gradual and flexible way.
.
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